O Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio convida a todas e todos para a próxima Oficina Leme (em alternância com o Seminário LEME): Pyrrhonism meets “Pyrrhonian skepticism about philosophy”, que será realizada por Conrado Vasconcelos (UFRJ).
Data e horário: 1 de outubro de 2026, quinta-feira, às 15h
Local: Sala L538, 5º andar do prédio Leme, PUC-Rio
Resumo: Bernáth and Tőzsér have recently defended what they call “Pyrrhonian skepticism about philosophy” (“PSP”), the view that you have an inescapable epistemic obligation to suspend your philosophical beliefs. According to them, we should accept PSP because we should suspend belief about claims over which there is permanent disagreement. Since there is permanent disagreement over big philosophical problems, this obligation should be extended to philosophical beliefs as well. One problem with PSP is that it seems to be self-defeating, as it would imply that we should suspend belief about the philosophical claims that are a precondition for PSP being true. Bernáth and Tőzsér’s solution to this problem is to argue that PSP is consistent and well-founded because we possess inalienable epistemic entitlement to believe these preconditions; and we are so entitled, they claim, because it is conceptually impossible to have any inalienable epistemic obligation to suspend belief about them. Bernáth and Tőzsér also argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, PSP still leaves room for philosophy as a worthwhile epistemic enterprise. My presentation will proceed as follows. First, I will present and explain Bernáth and Tőzsér’s defense of PSP and then offer my own objections against it. Second, I will argue that Bernáth and Tőzsér are unwarranted in qualifying their view as “Pyrrhonian”. Lastly, I will show that a Pyrrhonian skeptic would not be persuaded by PSP as they would use their own argumentative strategies for inducing suspension of belief against it.
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