

**Centro de Teologia e Ciência Humanas**

**Departamento de Filosofia**



**Programa para a disciplina**

**FIL 2320: FILOSOFIA DA LÓGICA**

**Prof. Luiz Carlos Pereira**

**HORÁRIO:** 5<sup>as</sup> de 9h às 12h.

**SALA:** Departamento de Filosofia

**SEMESTRE:** 2018.2

**CRÉDITOS:** 3

**CARGA HORÁRIA:** 45 horas

**OBJETIVOS:** O relativismo, em suas diferentes manifestações, tem sido um tema constante para investigações filosóficas. O debate sobre a possibilidade ou impossibilidade, comensurabilidade ou incomensurabilidade, de quadros conceituais (*Weltbilder*, Formas de vida) distintos apresenta-se como um caso fulcral no âmbito desse tema. Nosso objetivo neste curso será investigar diferentes aspectos e posições relativos a esse debate, com uma ênfase especial nos reflexos dessa investigação para a discussão contemporânea sobre conflitos radicais (*deep disagreements*).

#### **Bibliografia principal:**

DAVIDSON, D. “On the very idea of a conceptual scheme”. In: *Inquiries into truth and interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 183-198.

GLOCK, H-J. “On Safari with Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson”. In: ARRINGTON, R. & GLOCK, H. *Wittgenstein and Quine*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 144-172.

\_\_\_\_\_. “Relativism, commensurability and translatability. In: *Ratio* XX, Dec. 2007, p. 377-402. or In: PRESTON, J. (ed.) *Wittgenstein and reason*. US: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, p. 21-46.

HACKER, P.M.S. “On Davidson’s Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In: *The Philosophical Quarterly* 46. 1996, p. 289-307.

#### **Bibliografia Complementar:**

BLACKBURN, S. “Wittgenstein’s Irrealism” In: *Practical tortoise raising and other philosophical essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2010, p. 200-219.

DAVIDSON, D. “Responses to Barry Stroud, John McDowell and Tyler Burge”. In: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Nov., 2003), p. 691-699.

GLOCK, H-J. “Necessity and normativity”. In: SLUGA, H. & STERN, D. (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*. USA: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 198-225.

\_\_\_\_\_. “Quine and Davidson”. In: LEPORE, E. & LUDWIG, K. (eds.) *A Companion to Donald Davidson*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, p. 567-587.

HACKING, I. “Language, Truth and Reason”. In: HOLLIS, M. & LUKES, S. (eds.) *Rationality and relativism*. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1982, p. 48-66.

LEPORE, E. & LUDWIG, K. “The impossibility of alternative conceptual schemes”. In: *Donald Davidson: meaning, truth, language and reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 305-321.

McDOWELL, J. “Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism”. In: *The engaged intellect: philosophical essays*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Havard University Press, 2009, p.115-133.

STROUD, B. “Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding”. In: VERHEGGEN, C. *Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought and Action*. Toronto, York University, 2017, p. 123-138.

SANKEY, H. “Incommensurability, Translation and Understanding”. In: *The Philosophical Quartely*, vol. 41, No. 165, Oct. 1991, p. 414-426.

\_\_\_\_\_. “In defense of untranslatability”. In: *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 68. 1990, p. 1-21.

SINCLAIR, R. “A less radical interpretation of Davidson and Quine”. In: *Dialogue* 45(1). ?: 2006, p. 107-124.

### **Leitura recomendada:**

FOGELIN, R. J. “The logic of deep disagreements”. *Informal logic*, 7. 1985, p. 1-8. Reprinted in *Informal logic* 25. 2005, p. 3-11.

GODDEN, D. M. & BRENNER, W. H. “Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement”. In: *Cogency*. Vol. 2. No. 2. Spring: 2010, p. 41-80.